-Mr. Lamy, how would you describe the political and economic climate in Europe before the Maastricht Treaty?

A European momentum climate. Progress on the single market, on regional and social policies, and a major turning point in history with the fall of the Berlin wall and German reunification.

-Was there ever a moment of crisis or doubt during the negotiations when you thought the Treaty might not be signed?

Not really, as the collective will to achieve a big step forward was there. But more a question on whether or not the result  would meet our expectations at the end of the day.

-Mr. Lamy, you worked closely with Jacques Delors for almost a decade. How would you describe the relationship of trust you shared, and what role did it play in shaping European policy during that period?

I had been a close aide to Jacques Delors as Economy and Finance Minister in Paris and then his chief of staff and G7 sherpa since he had taken  the helm of the European Commission  in 1985. Time to build a strong and deep relationship based on shared political values, on  his visionary, strategic and communications formidable  capacities and my own taste for  getting things done..

The Maastricht moment was part of what he saw from the beginning as a bold European integration sequential agenda: starting with the single market, then boosting regional and social policies at EU level, then a common currency, then expansion of European competences to new domains such as environment,  justice and home affairs, foreign and security policy, all  successive stages leading to a more political Union. He  not only shaped the agenda, but also stepped into the more complex issues, for instance when he chaired the group of experts that delivered a blueprint for the monetary union.

-If you could change one element of the convergence criteria, what would it be and why?

The convergence criteria were a substitute to stronger European common economic and fiscal disciplines which Delors advocated but were seen as too federal by national governments. We built, as he would say, an economic and monetary union with a strong monetary leg but a weak economic one leading to an uncomfortable claudication. The monetary union with the Central Bank was good at tackling major crises. The economic union is still  partial,  imperfect, and has been much less efficient over time.

-Do you think the Treaty should have gone further in terms of political integration, or was it too soon at the time?

Yes, indeed. But the UK opposed systematically more ambitious steps in the direction. For the British, European integration was an economic machinery, not a political one. A good pretext or others who did not have to speak out.

-How realistic is the idea of a genuine political union in Europe today?

It is more necessary than ever given the return of brutal geopolitics and big power games  in the world, the dangers of European civilization disappearing in the future because of our demographic, economic, technological and strategic weaknesses.  European public opinions want it as shown by various quality pools. But European and national leaders collectively  lack both the vision and the political power to deliver what is urgently needed, i.e. new bold integration steps, now. This is why I just co-founded a new Jacques Delors- Friends of Europe Foundation in order to quickly mobilize more people and resources at the right big scale and force across all European countries.

-Looking back, what do you consider the greatest success and the greatest weakness of the Maastricht Treaty?

Greatest success: the Euro. Greatest weakness: an unfinished economic union with unanimity remaining for decisions in fiscal matters.

-How would you respond to critics who argue that the Treaty led to a “Europe of markets” rather than a “Europe of citizens”?

I share this view; but at the time ( and this is still the case although to a lesser extent)) there was more consensus between member states on economics than on political integration. Political integration, i.e. creating a new paneuropean political  space implies a feeling of belonging and an emotional mobilisation that is not yet  which are major components of a citizenship and which are not yet  there

-In your view, which of the subsequent Treaty revisions has been the most significant, and why?

The Lisbon treaty, after the failed attempt to adopt a European Constitution; It made institutions somehow less complex and kept rebalancing the European Parliament and the Council of member states, the two sources of European democratic legitimacy. But it unfortunately did not lead to majority voting in essential matters like  tax and budget.

-What should a “new Maastricht” for the 21st century look like?

Remove unanimity where it remains, increase the size of the EU budget to 5% of the EU GNP and move to  shared competences for strategic security and defense matters.

-How can the EU once again strike a balance between fiscal discipline and social cohesion?

Fiscal disciplines are a must of an economic union for credibility reasons. Social policies have, and should keep a strong national component as they are based on solidarity; social fractures of to day which  are feeding political discontent are at national level and not at European level

-Finally, what message would you give to the new generation of Europeans who grew up with the euro but may no longer believe in the European ideal?

Do you want to become Chinese or American?