Description
This blog post is based on the keynote delivered by Pascal Lamy, at the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) International Seminar in Hanoi, Vietnam. He examined the relationship between food security and international trade in Asia. His central proposition was straightforward: food security cannot be built by retreating from interdependence, but by making interdependence more resilient, diversified and sustainable.
Authors & contributors
Pascal Lamy
Food security sits at the intersection of human welfare, economic development and political stability. It is also increasingly shaped by forces that do not stop at national borders: climate disruption, conflict, volatile energy and fertiliser markets, changing diets, logistics failures and abrupt trade restrictions.
Recent crises have made those links impossible to ignore. The pandemic disrupted transport and supply chains. Russia’s war against Ukraine affected grain, fertiliser and energy markets worldwide. Extreme weather has damaged harvests across regions. In response, governments have understandably renewed their interest in food sovereignty and domestic capacity. But the debate often becomes confused when three distinct concepts are treated as if they were interchangeable: food security, food sovereignty and food self-sufficiency.
Food security means that people have reliable access to sufficient, safe, nutritious and affordable food. Food sovereignty concerns the ability of societies to shape their food systems and policy choices. Food self-sufficiency, by contrast, means producing domestically what is consumed. These objectives can overlap, but they are not the same. A country may produce most of its food and still experience hunger, malnutrition or unequal access to healthy diets. Another may import a substantial share of its food while ensuring secure supplies, affordable prices and meaningful domestic policy choices. The central challenge for Asia is therefore not how to eliminate interdependence. It is how to make interdependence reliable, diversified and sustainable.
Food systems are national responsibilities with international foundations
Feeding a population is a core responsibility of national governments. Yet food systems are international by nature. They rely on the movement of agricultural products, fertilisers, energy, machinery, technology, investment and knowledge. They also depend on access to land, water and transport infrastructure, all of which are unevenly distributed.
This is particularly visible in Asia. The region contains major agricultural exporters, fast-growing consumer markets, countries highly exposed to climate risks and economies that rely on imports for essential commodities or agricultural inputs. Rising incomes are also changing diets, increasing demand for more diversified products, including animal protein, dairy, oils, fruits and vegetables.
That diversity is not a weakness. It is one reason why trade matters. Production conditions vary enormously between countries: soil quality, rainfall, water availability, climate, technology and farming systems do not look the same everywhere. Asking every country to produce every commodity it consumes, regardless of those conditions, would often waste resources and increase environmental pressure.
Trade can help match supply with demand. It allows food to move from areas where it is abundant to places where domestic production is insufficient. It can spread production risks across countries and suppliers. It also gives farmers access to export markets and gives domestic producers access to equipment, seeds, fertilisers and technologies that strengthen their capacity.
The value of trade, however, is not dependence on a single supplier. It is diversification.
Different national pathways, shared vulnerabilities
Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines illustrate the different ways in which domestic resilience and international trade interact.
Vietnam is a major rice exporter, with the Mekong Delta at the heart of its production. Yet this success is increasingly exposed to saline intrusion, drought, floods and changing rainfall patterns. The challenge is to sustain farmers’ incomes and export capacity while adapting production to climate realities. Vietnam’s programme to develop one million hectares of high-quality, low-emission rice by 2030 points towards an approach that links productivity, income and environmental objectives. In this context, trade and climate adaptation can reinforce each other.
Indonesia demonstrates that being an agricultural exporter does not mean being self-sufficient in every commodity. It is a leading producer and exporter of palm oil, while also relying heavily on imported wheat. This is not a contradiction; it reflects different natural resources, consumer preferences and production conditions. But palm oil expansion also raises legitimate questions about land use, forests and biodiversity. The task is to preserve the economic benefits of trade while managing its environmental costs.
Thailand has long been a major rice supplier to international markets, but export competitiveness does not shield a country from shocks.
The Philippines, meanwhile, combines domestic rice production with import needs. Typhoons can damage crops and infrastructure. Stronger domestic production and storage can reduce exposure, while diversified import sources help bridge shortages when harvests fail. Neither domestic production nor imports alone provide a complete answer.
The common lesson is clear: resilience depends both on domestic capacity and on the ability to trade.
Trade is necessary, but not sufficient
Open markets do not automatically produce food security. Trade networks can work well in normal times and become strained during crises. Logistics can fail, prices can rise sharply and governments can change export policies with little notice. Climate and geopolitical shocks may occur simultaneously.
One familiar response is to restrict food exports. Governments facing rising prices or possible shortages naturally seek to protect domestic consumers. Such measures may appear prudent in the short term. Yet when multiple countries adopt them, they reduce supply for import-dependent economies, put pressure on world prices and encourage others to respond in kind.
A decision that may offer limited relief nationally can become costly collectively. This is a classic collective-action problem. That is why two simplistic positions should be avoided. The first is that all import dependence is inherently dangerous and must be eliminated. The second is that trade openness alone will guarantee food security.
Food has characteristics that require public policy. Agricultural production is exposed to weather and biological risks. Investment decisions have long time horizons. Capital (mostly land) is not mobile. Consumers cannot simply stop purchasing food when prices rise. And poorer households bear a disproportionate burden when food inflation accelerates. Markets can move food and transmit prices. Public institutions must help households and producers withstand shocks. These functions should reinforce each other.
Reframing food sovereignty as resilience
Food sovereignty is often discussed primarily as a target for domestic production. A more useful interpretation is the capacity to maintain policy choices and secure essential supplies when conditions change.
Dependence and vulnerability are not the same thing. A country importing from several reliable sources may be less exposed than one relying exclusively on domestic harvests vulnerable to drought. Conversely, a country producing much of its food may remain dependent on imported fertiliser, fuel or machinery. The relevant question is therefore not a single self-sufficiency ratio. It is the resilience of the whole food system. Four priorities follow from this approach.
First, countries need domestic productive capacity. Investment in research, irrigation, storage, roads, processing and support for farmers can improve yields, reduce avoidable losses and strengthen rural livelihoods.
Second, they need diversified trade relationships. A wider range of suppliers, transport routes and commercial partnerships reduces concentration risk. This applies not only to food commodities, but also to agricultural inputs.
Third, they need proportionate reserves and emergency mechanisms. Stocks can cushion temporary disruptions, provided they are transparent, managed at reasonable cost and not used to destabilise markets.
Fourth, they need effective access and social protection. Food may be physically available while remaining unaffordable to part of the population. Targeted assistance and nutrition programmes are part of a sound food-security strategy.
This is not an argument for indiscriminate protectionism, nor for governments to withdraw from food systems. It is an argument for public policies that preserve national choice while keeping international connections open and predictable.
Resilience is not the opposite of openness. It is what makes openness sustainable.
Rules and cooperation matter in times of stress
A resilient food system also requires rules beyond the national level. The World Trade Organization is often associated with lowering trade barriers, but its role is broader. A rules-based system gives governments, businesses and consumers greater predictability, limits arbitrary restrictions and provides a framework for managing disputes. Three practical priorities stand out.
The first is greater discipline and transparency around export restrictions. Governments must be able to respond to real emergencies. But restrictions should be transparent, proportionate and temporary, with careful consideration of their impact on importing countries. Policies that shift insecurity across borders do not solve the underlying problem.
The second is the protection of humanitarian food purchases. At the WTO Ministerial Conference in 2022, members agreed not to impose export prohibitions or restrictions on food purchased by the World Food Programme for non-commercial humanitarian purposes. This remains an important safeguard: humanitarian access should not become collateral damage in trade disputes.
The third is better market information. Reliable data on crops, stocks, prices and trade flows can help governments anticipate shortages and avoid policy decisions driven by rumours or panic. The Agricultural Market Information System, AMIS, shows how transparency can strengthen confidence in global markets.
Multilateral rules must leave room for food-security measures, rural development and environmental objectives. The issue is not whether states should act; they must. The issue is how to prevent national measures from exporting instability to others.
ASEAN has a practical role to play
Global rules are essential, but regional cooperation can turn common principles into practical solutions. ASEAN economies are connected through trade while facing different production patterns, climate risks and food import needs. That diversity creates opportunities for cooperation.
Emergency preparedness is one area. The ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve can complement national stocks and help make rice available during crises. Such mechanisms reduce the temptation to answer every shock with unilateral restrictions.
Trade facilitation is another. Border procedures, transport corridors, sanitary rules, cold chains and market information all influence the cost and reliability of food supplies. Improvements are particularly important for perishable products, where delays can quickly become losses, and for smaller farmers seeking access to wider markets.
Agricultural research and knowledge-sharing are equally important. Climate adaptation requires cooperation on drought- and salt-tolerant varieties, water management, lower-emission farming and soil health. The Mekong Delta is a powerful illustration: managing salinity, water, rice production and farmers’ livelihoods cannot be addressed through agricultural policy alone. It requires climate adaptation, research, local infrastructure and trade policy to work together.
Environmental sustainability must be part of this agenda. Rising demand for palm oil, rice and animal feed affects land, water, emissions and biodiversity. Importers and exporters should cooperate on workable standards and traceability, while helping smaller producers meet new requirements. Standards that simply exclude them would undermine the development objective they are meant to serve.
Stronger foundations at home, more reliable bridges abroad
Food security is not food autarky. Attempts to eliminate imports at any cost can replace diversified external supplies with concentrated domestic risks, often at higher cost.
At the same time, openness must be matched by public capacity. Countries need functioning farms and supply chains, diversified partners, appropriate reserves, investment in climate adaptation and protection for households unable to afford healthy diets. International markets can expand choices, but they cannot replace domestic institutions.
Food security is ultimately a test of cooperation. A climate shock in one producing region can affect consumers far away. An export restriction adopted in one capital can increase anxiety in another. Research and innovation can benefit farmers across borders. The way forward therefore lies at three levels: national policies that strengthen production and access; regional cooperation that prepares for emergencies and improves connectivity; and multilateral rules that keep trade predictable and prevent collective damage.
In a fragmented geopolitical environment, the temptation to turn inward is understandable. But the more constructive objective is not to reduce interdependence at all costs. It is to manage it through diversification, transparency, sustainability and cooperation.
Food security will not be built by walls around national food systems. It will require stronger foundations at home and more reliable bridges between countries.
